The rise of international financial centers in mainland China - 图文

18K.Chen,G.Chen/Cities47(2015)10–22insurancefundswereconcentratedinthe?nancialstreet.Infact,Beijingholdsthepredominantpowerintermsof?nancialinvest-mentdecisions.Allthesefactorscreateastronglocalizationeffectintermsofthe?nancialtalentpool,technologyspillover,innova-tion,andloweredtransactioncosts.AsecondpolicythathascontributedtothegrowthofBeijingasa?nancialcenteristheestablishmentofaCentralBusinessDistrict(CBD),locatedinChaoyangintheeasternsideofthecity.Inthe1993MasterPlan,thecitygovernmentofBeijingconceivedastra-tegicplantobuildacentralbusinessdistricttopromote?nance,information,commerce,andcultureindustriesinBeijing.In2001,theBeijingCBDAdministrativeCommitteewasestablishedtoplan,build,andmanagethedistrict.Thecommitteeisalsoresponsibleforprovidinginformationonlaws,taxes,andgovern-mentpoliciesaswellasaone-stopservicetosimplifyapprovalprocedures.In2011,theCBDhostedregionalheadquartersof50MNCsandsecuredinvestmentfrom160Fortune500businesses(Bjcbd,2011).Itisalsodrawingmanyinternational?nancialinsti-tutionsfromSouthKorea,Germany,Italy,andtheUnitedStates.Inaddition,itappealstooverseasstockexchangessuchthatNASDAQ,theNewYorkStockExchange,andtheTokyoStockExchangehaveestablishedof?cesinthedistrict.In2014,thecityofBeijinghostsatotalof48regionalheadquartersofFortune500companies,farexceedingShanghaiwithonlyfour(LWDF,2014).AthirdpolicydecisionthatmayberesponsibleforfosteringBeijing’s?nancialindustryisthecity’sannouncementsmadeintheyearsof2008and2009thatitintendstobecomea‘‘world?nancialcenter”anda‘‘worldcity”.Toachievethesegoals,Beijingwillstrengthenits?nanceandcommerceindustries,improveitsurbaninfrastructure,attractinternational?rmsandorganizations’headquarters,andstrengthenitsresearchanddevelopmentcapa-bilities,etc.(BeijingCommerce,2010).Byclusteringworld-leveltechnologyandhumanresources,BeijingaimstobeacompetitivecitylikeLondonandNewYorkCity.Inashortperiodoftime,alltheseinstitutionalmeasuresandpolicieshaveproducedastrongagglomerationeffectthatsupportsthegrowthofthe?nancialindustryinBeijing.AlthoughChina’scentralgovernmentdoesnothaveanexplicitpolicyofensuringthatBeijingbecomesanIFC,thestateisveryinvolvedinhelpingBeijingbecomemorecompetitiveinthisregard.The?nancialindustryhasbroughtmanybene?tstothecitysuchastaxandhumancapitalsuchthatthisindustryisoneofthemostimportant.Theindustryhasalsoservedtoincreasethecity’sglobalin?uence.InlightoftherapidgrowthoftheFinancialStreetandtheensuing?nancialrewardsaccruingtothecity,thelocalgovernmentofBei-jingproposedanof?cialplanin2008todevelopthecityasa?nan-cialcenterwithinternationalin?uence(Xinhua,2008).GivenBeijing’s?nancialresources,thisplanmayattractmoredomesticandforeign?nancialinstitutions,therebypresentingastrongchal-lengetoShanghai.Evenso,Beijing’sbidtobecomeanIFCishamperedbyitslackofastockmarket.AllIFCsworldwidehostastockexchangemarketasapowerfulandef?cienttoolforcapitalformationandasanindica-torofthecountry’seconomicstrengthanddevelopment.RecentWesternhistoryshowsagrowingpublicinterestininvestinginthestockmarketandshowsfunds?owingdirectlytothe?nancialmarketsinsteadofthroughtraditionalbank-lendinganddepositoperations.Overall,?nancialmarketsarebecomingmoreimpor-tantforcapitalaccumulationandeconomicgrowth(Levine,1997).Correspondingly,thelackofa?nancialmarketisamajordisadvantageforanycitywithhopesofbecominganIFC.CommandofandinvolvementintheglobaleconomyAsthecapitalcityofChina,Beijinghostsmajorstate-ownedenterprise(SOE)headquartersandholdsprevailingpoliticalandeconomiccontrolandcommandpoweratthenationalscale.Forinstance,allthreenationaltelecommunicationcompaniesareheadquarteredalongtheFinancialStreet.Expandedtothecitylevel,in2013,ofthe87companiesinmainlandChinathatmadetheFortune500list,48wereheadquarteredinBeijing.MostofthesecompaniesareSOEsthatcontrolessentialresourcesandinfrastructure,suchasSinopec,ChinaTelecommunications,StateGrid,andChinaNationalOffshoreOil.Despitethreedecadesofprivatizationandrestructuringsincetheeconomicreformsofthelate1970s,SOEsstillexertmajorcontroloverthenation’secon-omy,accountingformorethan40%ofChina’snon-agriculturalGDParound2010(Szamosszegi&Kyle,2011).Thedominantcon-trollingpoweroftheSOEsisattributedtoafavorablebusinessenvironmentcreatedbythestategovernment.Whencomparedtoprivatesectorcompanies,SOEsandtheirsubsidiariesenjoypre-ferredaccesstobankcapital,below-marketinterestratesonloansfromstate-ownedbanks,favorabletaxtreatment,andlargecapitalinjectionsfromthestategovernmentwhenneeded(Szamosszegi&Kyle,2011).NotonlydoSOEshavetheparamounteconomicpowerathome,theyarealsobecomingmorein?uentialintheglobalmarket.AdvancedbyChina’s‘‘GoingOut”policyandfueledbymassivefor-eignexchangereserves,large-scaleSOEshaveinvestedoverseasinthepastdecade,especiallyininfrastructure,naturalresources,andtheenergyindustry(Szamosszegi&Kyle,2011;Woetzel,2008).Therefore,SOEsarestrengthenedbothathomeandabroadthroughsupportfromthecentralgovernment,which,inturn,enforcesBeijing’sroleasadomesticandpotentialinternationalcontrolandcommandcenter.BeijingisatadisadvantagethankstothepotentialweaknessesoftheSOEs.First,eventhoughthefourlargestate-ownedbanksreceivesigni?cantassistancefromthecentralgovernmentontheirbalancesheetsandhavealsogreatlyimprovedtheirperformance,non-performingloansremainaproblemandimpairbankearnings(Chang,2012).Althoughtheseproblemswerenotrevealedtothegeneralpublic,lowaccounting/auditingstandardsmeanthatsuchbankscannotbecompetitiveifChinaabandonsitsclosed?nancialsystemandopensthebankingsectorinthelongrun.Second,althoughChina’sSOEsaregainingalargershareoftheglobalmar-ket,theyaremuchlesspro?tablethantheirinternationalcompet-itors(Galvez,2012).UnlesstheSOEsimprovetheirmanagementsystemandallocateresourcesmoreef?ciently,theycannotdevelopintoworld-classenterpriseswithmajorcontrolandcom-mandpowerintheglobalarena.However,itisuncertainwhethertheSOEscanachievesuchgoalswithoutsustainedgovernmentpolicysupport.Third,theseSOEslacktheabilitytoinnovate.Theirsuccesssofarhasreliedontheirstate-controlledmonopolystatusandassociatedstatepolicysupport.Almostnoneofthemhascoreproductsorinternationallyrenownedbrands,are?ectionofinsuf-?cientresearchanddevelopmentcapabilities.TheSOEsneedtomakehigher-qualityproductswithhighermarginsandofferser-vicestocomplementthem.Thelackofinnovativeabilitymaymakethemvulnerableintheinternationalmarket,andeveninthedomesticmarket,ifthemonopolyisbrokenandthestatenolongerprovidespreferentialtreatment.Therefore,thecontinuedgrowthofSOEsismaintainedbytheincompletemarketizationunderthecurrentgrowthmodelofstatecapitalism.AsWalterandHowie(2011)caution,ifChinafullyopensits?nancialmarket,revokessupportforitsfourlargestbanks,andeliminatesfavorablepoliciesforSOEs,the?nancialsec-torinBeijingmaynotbecomecompetitive.ShenzhenUrbaneconomyWhencomparedtoitstwonorthernrivals,ShenzhenhasasmallereconomybuthigherproductivityonapercapitabasisK.Chen,G.Chen/Cities47(2015)10–2219(Table3).LocatedonthesouthcoastofChina,thecitywasa?shingtownuntilthelate1970s.Itbecamegloballyengagedwhenin1980thecentralgovernmentdesignateditthe?rstspecialeco-nomiczone(SEZ)thatcouldacceptforeigninvestment.UnlikeShanghai,Shenzhenisarelativelyyoungcityandhasnotdevel-opedaneconomichinterland.SimilartoShanghai,though,Shenz-hendoesnothavestrongpoliticalpowerinthenationsuchasthatenjoyedbyBeijing.Instead,Shenzhenhasmainlybene?tedfromitsgeographicproximitytoHongKong,andthecity’slinkswithHongKongprovideafoundationforShenzhentospecializeinmanufacturingand?nance.TheroleofthestateWithstatesupport,Shenzhenhassucceededindevelopingsome?nancialmarkets.In1990,theShenzhenStockExchangewasestablishedbythestatecouncil.Fromtheyear2000–2004,ShenzhenStockExchangesuspendedlistingnew?rmsinprepara-tionforanewboardforhigh-techstart-ups.Thisseverelyunder-minedthestockexchange’sabilitytoattractcapital.ComparedtotheShanghaiStockExchange,whichmainlylistslarge-capcom-panies,theShenzhenStockExchangefocusesonsmall-andmid-capenterprises.TheShenzhenStockExchangeopenedtheChiNextboard,aNASDAQ-typeexchangeforhigh-growth,high-techstart-upsin2009.Thesehaveprovidedsomeplatformsfortechnologyinnovationand?rmgrowth.Amoreaggressiveandambitiousstepwasproposedbythelocalgovernmentandsubsequentlyapprovedbythecentralauthority.In2010,thestatecouncilapprovedthemasterplanforQianhaiBay,a15-square-kilometerzoneonthecity’swestcoast.Themostsigni?cantfeatureofQianhaiistheproposedspecializedlawsandregulationsonindustrialpolicies,taxpolicies,andpublicadministrationthatareclosetointernationalstandards(Economist,2012b).Also,bychargingalowcorporate-pro?ttaxandnotlevyingincometaxeson?nanceprofessionals,lawyers,accountants,andcreativepeople,itaimstoattractmodernserviceindustriesandtalent.Oneofthecity’scentralaimsistoattractsomeoftheoffshoreyuanthathavepooledoutsidemainlandChi-na’sborders.InQianhai,thegovernmentwillassist?rmsintheireffortstoraiseyuanoffshore,andHongKongbankswillbeallowedtoenterthezonemoreeasilycomparedtothecurrentsituation(Economist,2012b).Therewillbegreatercross-borderlending,andQianhaimaybecomeapioneerintermoftheyuan’sfullcon-vertibility.Basedonthesespecialpolicies,somemajorbankinginstitutionshavesignedcooperationagreementswiththenewQianhaiZonethusstrengtheningShenzhen’spositionasapotentialIFC(GlobalTimes,2012).ItishighlylikelythatthecreationoftheQianhaizonewillgenerateastronglocalizationeffect.CommandofandinvolvementintheglobaleconomyIntermsofitscontrolandcommandpowerinnationalandglo-balterms,Shenzhenhasonlyfourmajor?rmsthatmadetheFor-tune500listin2013,suchthatthecitylagsfarbehindBeijingandShanghai,whichhave48andeight,respectively.AmongthefourFortune500?rmsinShenzhenisHuawei,aprivatelyownedcom-panythatmanufacturesnetworkingandtelecommunicationsequipment.Althoughthefounderofthiscompanybene?tedfromconnectionswiththemilitary,Huaweihasastrongfocusonresearchanddevelopment.Foundedapproximatelythirtyyearsago,itishighlyprofessionalandimpressivelyinnovative,resem-blingaWestern-stylehigh-tech?rmmorethanatypicalChineseSOE.Aftersucceedinginthedomesticmarket,HuaweiexpandedintoLatinAmerica,Africa,andEasternEurope(Businessweek,2011).In2012,itovertookEricssonandbecamethelargestnet-workingandtelecommunicationsequipmentmakerintheworld.Huaweicanbeconsideredoneoftheworld’smostin?uentialandinnovativecompanies.ForthecityofShenzhen,Huawei’simpactexceedsitsmonetaryvalue.Thecompanyattractsbrightyoungpeople,actsasamodelforprivateenterprises,enrichestheentrepreneurialenvironment,andattractsinvestmentininfor-mationtechnology.Inregardtodomesticbankinginstitutions,ShenzhenfallsbehindBeijingandShanghai.OfthetoptenbanksinChina,Shenz-henhostsonlyChinaMerchantsBank(CMB),the?rstshare-hold-ingcommercialbankwhollyownedbylegalcorporateentitiesinChina.Despiteitsrelativelysmallsize,CMBprovidesmuchbetterservicesinmanyareasthanstate-ownedbanks.Forinstance,basedonitsearlyintroductionofaone-card-for-alldebitcard,CMBhasattractedalargeshareofhigh-qualitycustomersandestablishedastrongreputation.Itnowleadsthecountryintermsofcreditcardloansandotherprivatebankingbusinesses.Thisinturn,mayfur-therincreaseCMB’scompetitivenessinretailbanking.Inregardtoinsurancecompanies,ShenzhenishometoPingAnofChinaandSinoLife,twoofChina’stop?rmsinthisarea.Onthismeasure,ShenzhenissimilartoShanghai,whichalsohoststwotopinsur-ancecompanies,butfallsbehindBeijing,whichhas?ve.ThereisnodoubtthatShenzhen’spathtoglobalengagementbeganwithdependenceoncentrallydirectedresourceallocationsandacommitmenttoinvestmentzonesbynationalpolicymakers.However,Shenzhenhastwomajordisadvantages.First,thelackofalargedomesticmarketstronglymitigatesagainstShenzhen’sbidtobecomeanational?nancialcenter.Thecityalsolacksanaf?uenthinterlandfordevelopedmanufacturingchains.Second,itsprox-imitytoHongKongmaylimititsgrowth.AlthoughShenzhenhasbene?tedtremendouslyfromitsgeographicproximitytoHongKong,itspotentialIFCstatusisalsoovershadowedbythisproxim-ity.GivenHongKong’sinternationalstatus,itisunlikelythatShenzhenwilltakeoverorevenseriouslychallengeHongKong’sroleintheglobal?nancialindustry.SummaryOnepointthatallthreecitieshaveincommonisthatallhavebene?tedfromthecentralgovernment’spolicysupportintheirprogresstowardbecoming?nancialcenters.Shanghaibene?tedfromthestate’sdecisiontoestablisha?nancialdistrictwithfavor-ablepoliciesandtoestablish?nancialmarkets.Beijingbene?tedfromthestate’sapprovalofthecity’smasterplantobuilda?nan-cialstreetandacentralbusinessdistricttoattractmajorbankinginstitutions,regulatoryagencies,andSOEheadquarters.Thecity’saspirationtobecomeaworldcityalsohelpstogrowits?nancialindustry.Shenzhenbene?tedfromthestate’sdecisiontosetupspecialeconomiczonesasanexperimentalmarketeconomy.Forallthreecities,statepolicieshaveproducedastronglocalizationeconomyforthe?nancialindustry.However,eachcityhasdistinctstrengthsandweaknesses(Table6).Shanghai’sadvantagescomefromastronglocalandhin-terlandeconomy,growing?nancialmarketsthatareexpectingcontinuedreformanddevelopment,anestablishedreputationasa?nancialcenter,andinvolvementintheglobal?nancialmarket.Itsdisadvantagesincludealackof?nancialpolicydecision-makingagencies,powerfuldomesticcommercialbanksanddomesticMNCs,whichmaypreventthecityfrombecomingacontrolandcommandcenterandthusfrombecomingdominantasa?nancialcapital.Incontrast,Beijing’sadvantageliesinthefactthatthecityhoststhecentralbankandallregulatorycommissionsinbanking,insur-ance,andsecuritiesindustries,locatesmajorcommercialbanksandinsurancecompanies’headquarters,andconcentratesthelarg-estnumberofdomesticMNCheadquartersthatarein?uentialbothathomeandoverseas.Therefore,Beijingisanationaloreveninter-nationalpowercenter.Thecity’sdisadvantageisrelatedtothelackofamajor?nancialmarket,therelativelyweakperformanceand20K.Chen,G.Chen/Cities47(2015)10–22Table6

StrengthsandweaknessesofShanghai,Beijing,andShenzhenas?nancialcenters.

ShanghaiStrength1.Shanghaileadsothercitiesinurbaneconomyandhinterlandeconomy2.Shanghaihasdevelopedstockexchange,futuresexchange,foreigncurrencyexchange,andother?nancialmarkets3.Shanghaienjoysanestablishedreputationasa?nancialcenter4.ShanghaihasthemostforeignMNCregionalheadquarters1.Shanghaiisnotapowercenterinthenation2.Shanghailacksworld-renownedcommercialbanks3.ShanghailacksdomesticMNCheadquartersBeijing1.Beijinghostscentralbankandallregulatorycommissionsinbanking,insurance,andsecuritiesindustries2.Beijinglocatesmajorcommercialbanksandinsurancecompanies’headquarters3.Beijinghasasigni?cantnumberofdomesticMNChead-quarters,whicharein?uentialnotonlyinChinabutalsointheglobalarenaShenzhen1.ShenzhenisingeographicproximitytoHongKong2.Shenzhenenjoysthehighestproductivityamongthreecities3.ShenzhenhasdevelopedstronginformationindustryWeakness1.Beijinghasnostockexchange2.TheroleofBeijingmaybesubjecttothefutureofthestatecapitalismandtheperformanceofSOEs3.BeijingdoesnothostasmanyforeignMNCregionalhead-quartersasShanghai1.Shenzhendoesnothavealargehinterlandmarket2.ShenzhendoesnothavemanydomesticorforeignMNCheadquarters3.Shenzhenmaybeovershad-owedbyHongKong’sinter-nationalstatuscompetitivenessofstate-ownedbanksandnon-bankingenter-prises,andalowerlevelofinvolvementintheglobalmarketasithostsfewerforeignMNCregionalheadquartersthanShanghai.RegardingthesouthernrivalShenzhen,thecity’smainstrengtharisesfromitsproximitytoHongKong.Shenzhenenjoysthehigh-estlevelofproductivitywhenmeasuredbypercapitaGDPamongthethreecities,andhasdevelopedacompetitiveinformationtech-nologyindustrythatattractstalentandstrengthensthecity’sposi-tiononaglobalscale.However,thecityitselflacksbothalargehinterlandmarketanddomesticorforeignMNCheadquarters.ItsgeographicproximitytoHongKongmayalsoservetopreventShenzhenfromachievingIFCstatus.Overall,theoutcomesofthecompetitionamongthethreecitiesmaywellbeshapedbythevicissitudesofstategovernmentpoli-ciesandthepowerplaybetweenlocalandcentralstates.Indeed,itisnosurprisethatallthreecitieshavestrongconnectionswiththecentralgovernment.IftheChinesestategovernmentcontinuesthecurrentdevelopmentmodelofstatecapitalism,Beijing’sadvantagesasagrowing?nancialcentermaycontinue.However,ifChinafullyopensits?nancialmarketandremovesfavorablepol-icysupportforSOEs,the?nancialsectorinBeijingmaybecomelesscompetitive,andShanghaiandShenzhenmayseizemorepowerinthenational?nancialsector.TheracebetweenShanghaiandShenzhenmayhingeontheinstitutionalsupportandmarketfreedomintheformer’sFreeTradeZoneandlatter’sQianhaiZone.Further,thedynamiccontourmapofChina’sfutureIFCsoffersachancetogeneratehypothesesonthedevelopmentofIFCsinemergingeconomies.Whereaspreviousstudiesonglobal?nancialinstitutionshavefocusedontheroleofmarketforcesandbusinessenvironmentinthegrowthofIFCs,theroleofinstitutionalforcesunderdifferenteconomicsystemsandgrowthmodelsisrarelydis-cussed.Inthisstudy,we?ndthatalthoughthefactorsincludingagglomerationevidentin?nancialcitiesinanemergingmarketaresimilartothoseevidentinadvancedeconomies,theChinesecentralandlocalgovernments,inthiscase,appearstobethesingledominantfactorresponsibleforcreatingalocalizationeconomyandfavorableconditionsforthegrowthof?nancialcenters.Thisobservationmaybethekeytounderstandingtheriseof?nancialcentersinsomeemergingmarketsduringaglobaleconomicundertow.ConclusionThisstudyfocusedoncomparingthepotentialofthreemain-landChinesecities,Shanghai,Beijing,andShenzhen,asinterna-tional?nancialcenters.DatafromtheGlobal2000?nancial?rmsshowthatallthreecitiesimprovedtheirperformancefrom2005to2010andthatBeijingleadstheothertwocitiesinbothyears.ThenadetailedcomparisonindicatedthatShanghai’smajoradvan-tagesincludeadiverse?nancialmarketandastrongappealtooverseas?nancialinstitutes,drivenbythestate’spolicysupport.Shanghai’smajordisadvantageliesinitslackofcontrolpowerinthenationaleconomy.Incontrast,Beijing’smajoradvantageisitscommandandcontrolpowerinthedomesticandevenglobalmarket,throughalargeconcentrationofstate-ownedenterprises.SuchanadvantageisdeeplyrootedinChina’scurrentdevelopmentmodelofstatecapitalism.Ontheotherhand,Shenzhenhasconsid-erablylesseconomicpowerthantheothertwocitiesdo.Butithasbene?tedtremendouslyfromstatepoliciesanditsgeographicproximitytoHongKong.Overall,allthreeChinesecitieshavestrengthenedtheir?nan-cialindustriesthroughinstitutionalsupport,andthefuturepowerofthethreeleadingcitiesmaydependontheChinesegovern-ment’spolicies.Ifthestategovernmentcontinuesthecurrentmodelofstate-directedcapitalism,Beijing’sadvantagesasapoten-tialIFCmaycontinue.Instead,ifChinafullyopensits?nancialmarketandremovesitspolicysupportforSOEs,the?nancialsec-torinShanghaiandShenzhenmayseizemorepowerinthenational?nancialsector.ThentheracebetweenShanghaiandShenzhenmayhingeontheinstitutionalsupportandmarketfree-domintheformer’sFreeTradeZoneandthelatter’sQianhaiZone.Ourstudyprovidessomeimportantinsightsintotheinterplaybetweeninstitutionalforcesandglobalizationinatransitionaleconomy.AlthoughtheglobaleconomyandmarketopennessareconsideredsomeofthemostimportantfactorsunderlyingIFCsta-tus,inanemergingeconomicpowerhouselikeChina,thestateiscapableofempoweringthecountry’s?nancialcentersintheworldarenabyconsolidatingitsbankingsystems.Thestateisalsocapa-bleofstrengtheningacity’scompetitivenessasanationalorglobalcontrolandcommandcenterbystrengtheningSOEsthroughfavor-ablepolicies.Inaddition,thegovernmentdemonstrateditscom-mitmenttocreatingstrongagglomerationeffectsbyprovidingspace,physicalstructure,andresourcestonurture?nancialindus-triesinatleastsomeofitscities.Therefore,inappearance,China’sleading?nancialcitieshavepresentedapatternofagglomerationthatissimilartothoseof?nancialcentersinmarketeconomies,whilemorefundamentally,astrongstateunderincompletemark-etizationconditionsplaysadominantroleinpromotingthedevel-opmentofChina’scitiesintopotentialIFCs.Sucha?ndingiskeytounderstandingtheinterplaybetweenstatecapitalismandglobalforcesintheemergingmarket,wherethestatecanfunctionastheleadingeconomicactorintheglobalmarket.ThisconclusionK.Chen,G.Chen/Cities47(2015)10–2221offersanimportant?rststeptowardatheorycapableofdescribingthegrowthofIFCsinastatecapitalistsystem.Infutureresearch,wewillexaminetheextenttowhichitisef?cientandsustainableforthestatetosupportSOEsandconsiderwhetherstatecapitalismservestoaugmentthefreemarketasthepreferreddevelopmentmodelforemergingeconomiesintermsofIFCdevelopment.AcknowledgementThispaperwas?rstpresentedattheAnnualMeetingoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographersinSeattle2011.Wethankallthereviewersandtheeditorfortheirconstructivesuggestions.Theco-authorshavecontributedequallytothepaper.ReferencesAgnes,P.(2000).The‘EndofGeography’in?nancialservices?Localembeddednessandterritorializationintheinterestrateswapsindustry.EconomicGeography,76,347–366.Alfarano,S.,&Milakovic,M.(2008).Doesclassicalcompetitionexplainthestatisticalfeaturesof?rmgrowth?EconomicsLetters,101,272–274.Allen,F.,Qian,J.,&Qian,M.(2007).China’s?nancialsystem:Past,present,andfuture.InT.G.Rawski&L.Brandt(Eds.),China’sgreateconomictransformation.CambridgeUniversityPress.BankersAlmanac.BeijingCommerce(2010).Beijing:Whyaworldcity?January25,2010.Binns,P.,Cliff,T.,&Harman,C.(1987).Russia:Fromworkers’statetostatecapitalism.London:BookmarksPress.Bjcbd(2011).Bloomberg(2012).ForeignbankshitawallinChina.Bloombergnews,June7th,2012.Bremmer,I.(2009).Statecapitalismcomesofage.ForeignAffairs.Bremmer,I.(2011).Theendofthefreemarket:Whowinsthewarbetweenstatesandcorporations?NewYork:Portfolio.Businessweek(2011).AtHuawei,MattBrosstriestoeaseU.S.securityfears,September15th,2011.Cassis,Y.(2010).Capitalsofcapital:Theriseandfallofinternational?nancialcentres1780–2009.CambridgeUniversityPress.Chang,G.G.(2012).China’senrons.Forbes,November4th,2012.ChinaBankingRegulatoryCommission(CBRC).ChinaInsuranceRegulatoryCommission(CIRC).ChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission(CSRC).Clark,G.L.(2005).Money?owslikemercury:Thegeographyofglobal?nance.Geogra?skaAnnalerSeriesB,HumanGeography,87,99–112.Clark,G.L.,&Wojcik,D.(2005).Pathdependenceand?nancialmarkets:TheeconomicgeographyoftheGermanmodel,1997–2003.EnvironmentandPlanningA,37,1769–1791.Clark,G.L.,&Wojcik,D.(2007).Thegeographyof?nance:Theglobalmarketplaceforcorporategovernance.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Cohen,B.J.(1998).Thegeographyofmoney.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Dacosta,M.,&Foo,J.(2002).China’s?nancialsystem:Twodecadesofgradualreforms.ManagerialFinance,28,3–18.Demirguc-Kunt,A.,&Levine,R.(1999).Bank-basedandmarket-based?nancialsystems:Cross-countrycomparisons.WorldBankPublications.Dicken,P.(2003).Globalshift:Reshapingtheglobaleconomicmapinthe21stcentury(4thed.).ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublicationsLtd.Economist(1992).Financialcentres:Riseandfall.TheEconomist,323(S3).Economist(2011a).Singapore’s?nancialrise,April20th,2011.Economist(2011b).StatecapitalisminChina,November12th,2011.Economist(2012a).Emerging-marketmultinationals:Theriseofstatecapitalism,January21st,2012.Economist(2012b).China’scapitalcontrols:Themorespecialeconomiczone,July7th,2012.Economist(2012c).Theriseoftheyuan:Turningfromgreentored,October20th,2012.Economist(2013).Shanghaifreetradezone:ThenextShenzhen?October5th,2013.Eversheds(2009).Boomorgloom?Thebusinessoutlookfromleadersinestablishedandemergingglobal?nancialcentres.Eversheds.Fosfuri,A.,&Ronde,T.(2004).High-techclusters,technologyspilloversandtradesecretlaws.InternationalJournalofIndustrialOrganization,22,45–65.Friedmann,J.(1986).Theworldcityhypothesis.DevelopmentandChange,17,69–83.FT(2009).Chinacallsfornewreservecurrency,March4th,2009..Fujita,M.,&Thisse,J.F.(2000).Economicsofagglomeration:Cities,industriallocation,andregionalgrowth.Cambridge:UniversityofCambridge.Galvez,G.(2012).China’sSOEs:Stalledreformsoragentsofchange?TheChinaAnalyst,October2012.Garcia-Herrero,A.&Wooldridge,P.(2007).Globalandregional?nancialintegration:Progressinemergingmarkets.BISQuarterlyReview,57–70.Gehrig,T.(2000).Citiesandthegeographyof?nancialcenters.InJ.Huriot&J.F.Thisse(Eds.),Economicsofcities:Theoreticalperspectives.CambridgeUniversityPress.Gerard,L.(2007).Statecapitalism:Theriseofsove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