（范例）外文翻译格式

constant supply of the needed merchandise through exclusive dealings. Such merchandise often includes high quality brand name products that many Japanese consumers tend to favour over the unknown quality of obscure brand products. With the long-term stability and security guaranteed by the keiretsu system, the keiretsu manufacturer can bring its downstream distributors and retailers under its wing and thus assure long-term partnership with its members. That is to say, keiretsu member distributors and retailers are likely to adapt their delivery schedule to the requirements of their customers on a stable basis. Japanese market penetration strategies

In the past year, Japanese bought twice as many US products ($47.9 billion in total) as they did about eight years ago. As opposed to what many Americans allegedly believe, this statistic indicates that the Japanese market is not impenetrable. Although a majority of Japanese consumers may not be content with Western-style marketing and distribution strategies, there is an increasing sign of hope. For example, several US firms, such as Coca-Cola, Salomon Brothers, and Toys “R” Us, are reported to make more profits in Japan than in the USA. In addition, many other US firms such as McDonald’s, Schick, IBM, Xerox, Motorola, Bose, and Johnson & Johnson have captured the number one market share in Japan thanks to their emphasis on customized marketing tailored for Japanese consumers. The recent marketing success in Japan is not limited to US firms. A growing number of European and Asian firms have begun to attain a strong foothold in Japan through their strong commitment to product quality and variety. These firms include the German automaker, BMW; the Italian sportswear producer, Fila; the Belgian chocolate maker, Dalloyau; the French cosmetic firm, L’Oreal, and the Taiwanese bicycle manufacturer, Giant. Following suit, other US firms can capture a larger share of the Japanese market by adopting a number of proactive marketing/distribution strategies described below.

Targeting specialized niche markets

Targeting the neglected segment of the Japanese market has proven to be a successful strategy for some US firms operating in Japan. For example,American Family Life Assurance Company (AFLAC) based in Columbus,Georgia, began to sell cancer insurance policies in Japan where cancer is the number one killer. Although foreign firms used to share less than 3 percent of Japan’s $390 billion-a-year insurance market, AFLAC found a way to insure 28 million Japanese primarily for cancer, roughly 22 per cent of the Japanese population. Its unusual success in the tightly regulated Japanese market is due to AFLAC’s recognition that supplemental cancer insurance was largely neglected by Japanese competitors who focused on typical life and health insurance. As such, AFLAC was given

the license to sell cancer insurance policies including so-called “Super Cancer” which pays a cash disbursement when cancer is first diagnosed, because selling such policies are not in direct competition with Japanese insurance companies.

As Dorney, a co-founder of Daytimers, succinctly summarizes, the success in the foreign market rests on the company’s ability to recognize and deal with the special characteristics of its chosen market segment. Such ability is particularly important in Japan, because Japan is broken down into fragmented market segments, each with its own distinct distribution culture, tastes, and territories. Considering this, the foreign firm may concentrate efforts on only the most attractive or untapped market segments and later expand distribution. Those efforts, however, may take years to pay off. Selling under Japanese brand names

Though less inclined towards conspicuous consumption, Japanese consumers tend to display great respect for goods produced by the large corporation which carries famous brand names and good image. Very often, such a corporation happens to be the well-known Japanese firms. Considering the Japanese consumer’s brand loyalty, some Asian firms such as Korean electronic manufacturers and Hong Kong garment makers, sold their products successfully in Japan under the Japanese brand names. Selling under Japanese brand names, however, means that the foreign firm delegates all of their marketing and distribution tasks to the local Japanese distributor. Thus,the foreign firm’s ability to exercise control over how its products are marketed will be greatly restrained. Also, the foreign firm’s chance of gaining a strong foothold in the Japanese market may diminish, since it cannot establish its own consumer brand loyalty. Emphasizing follow-up services

Although Detroit’s big three automakers are expanding sales of US models in Japan, their market share remains a tiny slice (less than 1 per cent) of the Japanese auto market. One of the main reasons for sluggish sales of US cars in Japan is a lack of effort on the part of US automakers to improve their postsales services. For instance, Inoue, senior managing director of Autorama, pointed out that it often took two to three weeks to receive spare parts for Ford models compared with two to three days required to obtain spare parts for Japanese-made cars. On the other hand, BMW invested $29.7 million to improve their follow-up services including quick part delivery and such an effort may have helped them become the number one import automaker in Japan. “Piggybacking”

In an effort to circumvent the Japanese distribution maze, some US companies are “piggybacking” with other US ventures which have already established their own

distribution channels in Japan. For example, Blue Diamond Almond Growers of California teamed up with Coca-Cola to take advantage of the complementary nature of snack foods and soft drinks, while utilizing Coca-Cola’s well-established distribution routes in Japan. As a result, Blue Diamond has successfully achieved its target goal of 40 per cent of the Japanese market share in ten years. In another example, Shop America aligned with 7-Eleven in Japan to distribute their catalogues to potential Japanese consumers and take orders from them through the well-established 7-Eleven’s distribution network.

As illustrated above, piggybacking is an effective means of circumventing the locked-up distribution channel in Japan. However, it is not without some drawbacks, such as a limited opportunity of piggybacking for noncomplementary product lines, the piggyback rider’s limited direct control over its distribution operations, and the compensation of the piggyback carrier for its distribution services.

Selling directly to non-keiretsu chain stores or “cash-and-carry” wholesalers Although excluded from carrying many traditional Japanese national brands, the so-called “cash-and-carry” wholesaler has emerged as the major distribution force in the Japanese wholesale sector. They defy norms by bypassing the traditional multilayered distribution channel, and distributing foreign imports at substantially lower prices through discount stores. Since they are not affiliated with the keiretsu network, many foreign firms which are excluded from the distribution keiretsu may channel through the well-recognized “cashand-carry” wholesalers such as Etoile Kaito and Companies. In fact, Stone noted that South Korean TV makers and Taiwanese computer manufacturers utilized these independent wholesalers to market their products to Japanese consumers.

Similarly, non-keiretsu retail giants such as Daiei, Ito-Yokado, and Seiyu, bought $2.05 billion worth of goods directly from neighbouring Asian countries and successfully sold them under their own brand names at discounted prices. Although Japanese consumers are less sensitive to price advantages than are their US counterparts, the aforementioned forms of distribution recently gained popularity from Japanese consumers who have become more price conscious due to ongoing recession in Japan and gradual changes in their lifestyles. Despite numerous merits, the foreign exporter’s heavy reliance on unauthorized Japanese distributors may undermine consumer loyalty to its products, because many Japanese consumers channelled through the unauthorized distributor can be excluded from post-sales warranty services and product recall. Direct marketing

Some foreign firms such as Daytimers, Amway, and Otto Versand, which were overwhelmed by the Japanese distribution complexity, have developed a variety of direct

marketing techniques involving telemarketing, daytime TV shopping, door-to-door selling, in-home party, and mail ordering to reach Japanese consumers directly. Although direct marketing accounted for only 1 per cent of Japanese retail sales in 1987, it shows a sign of promise. According to the Japanese Ministry of Labour, retail sales through direct marketing have doubled from 1983 to 1988[45]. This drastic increase in the volume of direct marketing retail sales may have resulted from the increase of Japanese working women who have less free time to shop. In fact, Dodwell Marketing Consultants reported that over 50 per cent of Japanese working women used mail order at least once a year, while only 30 per cent of working men bought merchandise through mail order. For example, many Japanese women are unwilling to buy their underwear and hosiery at the retail store, because they often feel shame when shopping for those products in public. Therefore such merchandise can be a perfect candidate for mail-order-based direct marketing.

Nonetheless, some direct marketing techniques require fine tuning. For example, telemarketing targeted for Japanese housewives may backfire because they could be easily offended by unsolicited phone calls from strangers. Mail order sales also may create problems, because of unusually high mail cost, lack of a third class rate, and serious difficulty in obtaining direct mail listings in Japan. Conclusions

In recent years the US policy makers made the Japanese distribution barrier one of the most significant topics at bilateral negotiations with the Japanese government for the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. However, many US firms interested in entering the Japanese market are often unaware of various opportunities for turning what is considered to be a market entry barrier into advantageous incentives aiding entry. Such unawareness is due in large part to the Westerner’s misunderstanding of the Japanese distribution system, which has long evolved from Japanese cultural and historical roots. For instance, Americans tend to perceive the Japanese distribution system as a “closed” and exclusive lockout, whereas the Japanese tend to view their system as one of “close” co-operation crucial for the constant harmony of their society. From Table I, it is evident that the Japanese cultural base is quite different from its US counterpart. Therefore, it is na?ve to evaluate the Japanese distribution system from the US perspective only. As Goldman observed, the Japanese distribution system displays high levels of consumer responsiveness, coordination,and equity, while yielding low labour productivity.

Recognizing those differences, it is time for the US companies to re-formulate their distribution/marketing strategies which can adapt to the current Japanese rules and